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Abstract 
 
Prior examination of financial disclosures associates increasing linguistic complexity with poor 
firm performance, but cannot differentiate between competing signaling and managerial 
obfuscation hypotheses. In order to assess whether the lexical properties of written language 
signal discloser quality, I analyze borrower submitted free-form descriptions of anonymous peer-
to-peer loans and find that borrower misspellings predict lower funding rates, longer time to 
fund, higher default rates, and lower yields to lenders. My findings suggest that the lexical 
properties of writing are a signal of the writer’s quality.  
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Chapter I: Introduction
 
 Recent literature regarding large-sample textual analysis of corporate disclosures has 
examined the effects of linguistic complexity on the ability of financial statement users to 
interpret the information contained within those disclosures (Lehavy, Li & Merkley, 2011; Lee, 
2012). This work establishes that the lexical properties of written language affect the behavior of 
financial statement users, and extends the textual analysis literature which suggests that firms 
intentionally obfuscate the information in their annual reports via linguistic complexity (Li, 
2008). However, because this literature studies the linguistic complexity of financial statements 
of firms with varying levels of operational complexity, and with varying strategic needs, much of 
the textual analysis literature suffers from endogeneity concerns (Li, 2010). Several of these 
studies test a set of joint hypotheses: that textual analysis is able to reveal something about the 
disclosing firm; and that managerial language is a strategic choice. Furthermore, in Brochet et 
al., (2012), which suggests that linguistic complexity in conference calls is a function of 
language barriers and is therefore not strategic, the managers of foreign firms are in a controlled 
environment and are likely coached in terms of communication style. In order to clearly establish 
that the lexical properties of written language are an attribute of disclosure that impacts how the 
disclosure is used, it is important to distinguish strategic choices in writing from the existence of 
certain lexical properties. 
 In this study, I attempt to answer whether the lexical properties of written language in 
financial disclosure reveal information about the discloser. Specifically, I examine whether 
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spelling ability affects lender decisions and predicts borrower quality in an online peer-to-peer 
lending setting where voluntary disclosures by borrowers are common, and the general 
information environment is far sparser than in traditional capital markets. 12 The key aspect of 
misspelling as my measure in this context is that it is unlikely that someone would deliberately 
misspell. Therefore, misspellings are unlikely to represent a strategic choice, and I can eliminate 
communication strategy as a confounding issue.3  
 Prior literature suggests that spelling ability (or inability) affects perceptions of 
intelligence (Figueredo & Varnhagen, 2005; Scott et al., 2014; Vignovic & Thompson, 2010), 
credibility (Everard & Galleta, 2006; Stiff, 2012, Vignovic & Thompson, 2010), 
conscientiousness (Figueredo & Varnhagen, 2005; Everard & Galleta, 2006; Vignovic & 
Thompson, 2010, Boland & Queen, 2015) and employability (Scott et al., 2014), while 
propensity to misspell is negatively related to education (Hargittai, 2006) and intelligence 
(Kreiner et al., 2002). Furthermore, prior research shows that misspelling is strongly correlated 
with reading disability (Russell, 1955; Hinshaw, 1992). Reading disabilities have been linked to 
behavioral problems (Hinshaw, 1992; Beitchman et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1993), and tend to be 
persistent, depending on other environmental factors (Beitchman et al., 1996; Rutter & Yule, 
1975; Spreen, 1988). Consistent with these findings, individuals with reading disabilities from all 
socioeconomic backgrounds have poorer educational and occupational outcomes than the non-
disabled, which are related to insolvency and bankruptcy (Spreen, 1988; Pape et al., 2011, 
Devaney & Lytton, 1995). Because hard credit information is backward looking, and explains 
                                                           
1
 By this I mean that there are far fewer signals of quality, such as analyst reports, media reports, networks and 
relationships. 
2
 The relative lack of information allows me to more easily extract the effects of the disclosures and their 
misspellings while also allowing me to control for almost anything the lender may have access to. At the same time, 
such an environment may limit the generalizability of my study. 
3 While misspelling and linguistic complexity are different constructs, both are lexical properties of written language 
and can influence a person’s perceptions of the communication and potentially its use (Rennekamp, 2012; Stiff, 
2012). 
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only a small portion of future default, misspelling could contain soft information about borrower 
type, and could therefore be predictive of future loan outcome (Petersen, 2004.) 
 Taking these findings together, I hypothesize that misspellings directly and negatively 
influence the capital allocation decisions of lenders, which I measure as the dollar amount of 
funding provided per day, and as the time it takes to fully fund the loan.4 I also predict that 
misspellings are predictive of adverse loan outcomes, such as incidence of default and decreased 
returns. Consistent with this perspective, I find that misspellings in borrowers’ voluntary 
disclosures influence loan decisions, and are predictive of loan outcomes. In particular, I find 
that misspellings predict lower funding rates for loans, longer time to fully fund the loans, higher 
default rates, and lower yields to lenders. For instance, I find that each misspelling in a loan 
description predicts a marginal decrease in funding of $30 per day, a marginal increase in the 
time to fully fund of 2.6%, a marginal increase in the default rate of 0.8% and a marginal 
decrease in yield of 0.6%. 
 Peer-to-peer lending is a means for borrowers to “crowdfund” projects such as debt 
consolidations or home improvements from online lenders. Lending companies serve as 
intermediaries by attracting borrowers with better loan terms than those offered by traditional 
lenders as well as a quick and convenient loan application process, and by providing 
underwriting and collections services for lenders.5 The data for my study are obtained from 
Lending Club, the largest peer-to-peer lending company in the United States. The information 
lending companies such as Lending Club provide to lenders includes loan characteristics, 
                                                           
4
 As the price (interest rate) of the loan is set before a loan description is completed, misspellings cannot affect 
price; therefore, misspelling’s effect on loan demand can be measured purely with respect to the supply of funds. 
Because almost all of the loans in the sample are fully funded, I measure demand using funding rate, measured in 
dollars per day, as well as time to fully fund, measured in days. 98.6% of the loans in the sample are fully funded. 
5
 A Lending Club survey of 20,913 Lending Club borrowers indicates that borrowers borrow at rates 31% lower 
than the rates on their other unsecured debt. 
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borrower characteristics, borrower credit history and a written description of the loan composed 
entirely by the borrower and submitted at his option after the underwriting process is completed.6 
The fact that the loan description is submitted after the loan is underwritten allows me to 
distinguish the demand effects of the loan description while holding the interest rate constant.7 
Figure 1 provides an example of a loan listing by Lending Club as presented to the lenders. 
In contrast to traditional lending, peer-to-peer lending is almost always anonymous. 
Anonymity implies that a lender is unable to acquire information about a borrower beyond what 
is included in the loan application. Consequently, a borrower’s description of the loan and related 
representations potentially play a more important role in a peer-to-peer lending decision than in a 
traditional loan setting. However, because a borrower’s written description of the loan is 
optional, its contents and presentation are entirely discretionary. For example, these descriptions 
often include representations of the borrower’s personality traits, pleas for assistance, as well as 
unverifiable claims about the borrower’s financial security. Importantly, although a borrower’s 
decision to provide these disclosures is deliberate and potentially strategic, his propensity for 
spelling and grammar errors is likely not.8 Hence, I suggest that misspellings in voluntary 
disclosures represent a clear signal of poor borrower quality and are used by lenders to make 
their loan decisions. 
Prior peer-to-peer lending studies have examined various features of written loan 
descriptions, other than misspellings, and have found that lenders often rely on these descriptions 
despite the “cheap-talk” nature of borrowers’ claims. For example, Michels (2012) and 
                                                           
6 As of March 2014, loan descriptions are no longer provided to lenders due to privacy concerns and increase 
regulatory requirements imposed on peer-to-peer lenders. 
7 Because the loan descriptions are written and submitted after the terms of the loan (interest rate, amount and term) 
are set, the terms of the loan are exogenous to the contents of the description. 
8
 Because this is in the context of for-profit microlending, it is unlikely that any empathy received for presenting 
oneself as pitiable will outweigh the negative effects of misspelling on lenders’ perceptions. To the extent that any 
borrowers are purposely misspelling, this will bias against finding a result. 
5 
 
Herzenstein et al., (2011) find that borrowers that provide these types of voluntary disclosures 
often attract more lenders and borrow at lower interest rates than others.9 In a more recent study, 
Gao & Lin (2013) find that more readable, positive, and less deceptive disclosures are positively 
related to higher lender demand and higher quality loans. In contrast to the focus of prior studies, 
the distinguishing feature of misspellings is that they are not premeditated or intentional. 
Whereas borrowers may deliberately provide more readable and less deceptive disclosures or 
strategically engage in cheap-talk, they do not deliberately misspell. Hence, I do not expect 
measures of readability and deception employed in prior peer-to-peer lending studies to fully 
capture the effect of misspellings. Nevertheless, I control for measures employed in prior studies 
(e.g., Flesch-Kincaid ease of reading, Gunning-Fog index) in my tests and find that my findings 
are qualitatively unaffected by their inclusion. 
 My paper contributes directly to the textual analysis in capital markets disclosure 
literature by establishing that the characteristics of the language used within the disclosure 
provides a meaningful signal of participant quality. Recent work in this area has suggested that 
this could potentially be the case, leaving it an open question (Brochet et al., 2012; Bloomfield, 
2008). My findings imply that firms which exhibit certain lexical properties in their disclosures, 
whether strategically or nonstrategically, may be incurring a hidden cost by doing so. With 
regard to the literature surrounding peer-to-peer lending, my paper extends the work in 
“understanding what individuals can do to signal creditworthiness through narratives” (Morse, 
2015). Given the nature of the peer-to-peer lending market, my paper also answers the call from 
John Campbell’s 2006 Presidential Address to the American Finance Association (Campbell, 
2006), which sought attention to issues of household investing mistakes and their attendant 
                                                           
9
 These studies use Prosper.com data from the period before it was shut down by the SEC. In this period, loans were 
not priced by Prosper.com, but rather were posted with all borrower-submitted information and rates were set via 
auction. As a result, information contained within the disclosure could affect interest rate. 
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welfare costs. In addition, while many studies have shown relations between misspelling and 
perceptions of the misspellers (e.g., Scott et al., 2014), misspellings and traits of the misspellers 
(e.g., Hargittai, 2006), and even misspellings and their effects on the behavior of counterparties 
(e.g., Everard & Galleta, 2006), to my knowledge, my paper is the first to find that misspellings 
are predictive of real misspeller performance. My paper also establishes that in the context of a 
debt market, misspellings are a potentially important source of soft information when 
information is sparse and information asymmetries are potentially severe. Finally, although my 
study is set in the distinctive peer-to-peer lending setting, my findings suggest that misspellings 
in disclosures are consequential in any setting where information asymmetries loom large and 
reliable information is limited, such as other online markets or in contracting settings. 
 The rest of my paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides information about peer-to-
peer lending and discusses the development of my hypotheses; Section III includes information 
about the data used in the analyses; Section IV explains the research design and discusses the 
results; Section V contains additional analysis on the effects of misspelling; and Section VI 
concludes. 
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Chapter II: Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
 Peer-to-peer lending is a way for borrowers to “crowdsource” capital over the internet 
from multiple lenders in the form of unsecured loans. Borrowers apply for loans via websites 
such as LendingClub.com or Prosper.com, and these companies then act as underwriters for the 
loans. Following the underwriting process, a borrower can reject or accept the terms offered by 
the website, and if the borrower accepts, the loan is made available to the website’s pool of 
lenders. This partial disintermediation allows for lower interest rates by avoiding costs associated 
with traditional brick-and-mortar banks. However, it also implies that information asymmetries 
are potentially more severe. Without the soft information which traditional lenders obtain from 
their interactions with borrowers in the loan application process, anonymous lenders over the 
internet are at a relative disadvantage. In light of this disadvantage, evidence suggests that 
anonymous lenders are willing to consider information that is unverifiable cheap-talk (Michels, 
2012), or that more traditional lenders are legally barred from using for ethical reasons (Pope & 
Sydnor, 2009, Ravina, 2012). 
 In this paper, I examine data provided freely to the public by LendingClub.com.10 
Lending Club is the market leader in peer-to-peer lending activity in the United States, having 
facilitated over $9 billion in loans since its inception in 2007, including over $1.6 billion in the 
first quarter of 2015. 72% of the loans originated through Lending Club are for debt 
consolidation or credit card refinancing according to the borrowers, and borrowers claim to be 
                                                           
10 This data can be downloaded at https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action 
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from every state in the country with the exception of Iowa, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
North Dakota and Vermont. The borrowers must be long-term residents of the United States, and 
must be at least 18 years old and have a verified bank account. 
 To obtain a loan from Lending Club, the potential borrower submits to a credit check at 
LendingClub.com. Lending Club then evaluates the information and provides a menu of loan 
terms (i.e., interest rate, amount, loan term) to the borrower. Upon acceptance of a loan, the 
borrower is given the opportunity to complete an optional, free-form disclosure, which is the 
subject of this study. This takes place after the interest rate, amount and loan term are set, and 
therefore the disclosure cannot affect the terms of the loan. There are no formal requirements for 
this section, which is simply labeled “Loan Description.” Borrowers also have the option to 
answer scripted questions that lenders submit in this section.11 
 When the application is complete, and the terms of the loan are set, the loan is released to 
the Lending Club lender base.12 13 Lenders at Lending Club must reside in of one of 27 states 
which permit lending in these markets.14 At no point is any personally identifiable information 
about the borrower released to the lenders; the borrower remains anonymous. This anonymity 
forces lenders to consider only the information which is submitted through the loan listing when 
making their decisions. Once the loans are posted, lenders can select the loans to invest in, and 
                                                           
11 As of October, 2013, demand for these loans has increased to the point where 100% of the loans which pass 
through Lending Club’s screening process are fully funded. Because of this, and because of the regulatory costs 
associated with filing each loan with the SEC, Lending Club has recently stopped allowing borrowers to submit 
these loan descriptions. 
12 Lending Club’s main rival, Prosper, recently indicated that 80% of new loans originated through their site went to 
institutional lenders (Cortese, 2014), and it seems that institutions are similarly active at Lending Club. 
13 Aside from information obtained from media articles describing the investor base, and rules set by Lending Club, 
I have no information about the Lending Club lender base (e.g. Lender type, size of note purchased, number of 
lenders to a given borrower.) 
14 The 27 states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Residents of all 
other states except Kansas, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon and Washington, DC can buy and sell these notes in a 
secondary market. 
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the amount (in increments of $25) to invest in each loan. These decisions are driven by the risk 
preferences of the lenders, as well as any strategies that the lenders believe will allow them to 
increase returns or satisfy biases.15 When the loan is fully funded, the proceeds (less origination 
fees) are released to the borrower’s verified bank account. Figure 2 contains a graphic depicting 
the lending process. Payments are made by automatic monthly electronic funds transfers from 
the borrower’s bank account. In the event of a failed payment, Lending Club is responsible for 
bringing delinquent borrowers back to current status, or for turning the loan over to an external 
collections agency. Loans which are 121 days past due are in default, with charge off occurring 
no later than 30 days after default. 
 Prior studies of peer-to-peer lending have focused almost exclusively on Prosper 
Marketplace (hereafter Prosper), Lending Club’s primary competitor in the peer-to-peer lending 
market. Prior to 2009, Prosper used an auction pricing mechanism in setting its interest rates. In 
that setting, researchers proxied for lender demand using interest rate and number of bids. In the 
Lending Club setting, funding rate and time to fund are much clearer indications of lender 
demand, as the price of the loan is fixed and demand is reflected in how quickly the loan is 
funded. An additional key difference between the settings is that on Prosper.com, borrowers 
were allowed to post pictures and join social network “groups.” 
 There are three main branches of the literature on how lenders deal with the greater 
adverse selection problems of online unsecured lending: picture based analysis; social network 
based analysis; and borrower submitted text based analysis, as in this study. For an excellent, 
thorough review of the nascent peer-to-peer lending literature, please see Morse (2015).   
                                                           
15 Lin & Visnawathan (2014) find that there is home bias in peer-to-peer lending. They conjecture this may be a pro-
social rather than a returns boosting bias. 
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 To perform appearance based analysis, authors test whether subjective judgments of 
borrower submitted pictures affect lender demand for those borrowers’ loans. Duarte et al. 
(2012) find that subjective judgment of borrower trustworthiness is correlated with lower interest 
rates, and predicts lower default and higher net yield. Pope & Sydnor (2009) and Ravina (2012) 
find that lender demand decreases when the borrower appears to be black, but their findings 
related to loan outcomes are mixed. Pope & Sydnor (2009) also finds that lender demand 
increases when the picture indicates the borrower is female, but this has no predictive power over 
loan outcome. Ravina (2012) examines the effect of beauty in this setting, showing that loans 
with pictures of more beautiful people are correlated with greater lender demand, but also worse 
loan outcomes. Pictures are no longer allowed as part of the loan listings at Prosper, and have 
never been permitted at Lending Club. 
 In the original Prosper setting, one mechanism which was available to borrowers to signal 
their quality was the ability to join groups, which are frequently but not necessarily affinity based 
(e.g., employer, alumni, religion). Some of these groups provided attestation services to the 
borrowers who joined for an upfront fee. Maier (2014) studies these groups, showing that group 
membership increases the probability that a loan is funded, but that these verification services 
must be in place to affect the borrower’s interest rate, and to predict loan outcome. Hildebrand et 
al. (2013) also investigates these groups, and finds that when a borrower pays a fee to the group 
leader in exchange for the leader’s bids, this is viewed by lenders as a signal of quality, while it 
actually is predictive of worse loan outcomes. These groups are no longer a part of the Prosper 
lending process, and were never present in the Lending Club market. 
 With respect to the user submitted textual submissions, several papers have investigated 
whether and how lenders use these loan descriptions
11 
 
asymmetry. Michels (2012) and Herzenstein et al., (2011) show that borrowers frequently use 
loan descriptions to make unverifiable claims about themselves, or about their current financial 
standing, finding that these unverifiable claims increase lender demand, on average. With respect 
to loan outcomes, Michels (2012) finds that the lender response to the disclosures about financial 
standing is negatively related to default. On the other hand, the results in Herzenstein et al., 
(2011) show that identity claims, while positively related to lender demand, are also positively 
related to default. This suggests that lenders were making suboptimal investment decisions with 
respect to identity claims. Through textual analysis, Gao & Lin (2013) assess the effect of 
various writing characteristics on lender demand and their relation to loan default. They use 
measures of readability, optimism, objective language, and deception and find that more readable 
and positive and less deceptive disclosures are related to higher lender demand and higher 
quality loans.  
 Additionally, prior literature shows that peer-to-peer lenders are subject to home bias 
(Lin & Viswanathan, 2014) and that business loans attract more lender demand, but default at a 
higher rate (Mach et al., 2014.)16 I control for these findings in my tests by controlling for the 
borrower’s home state, as well as by controlling for the stated purpose of the loan. 
  The peer-to-peer lending setting described above suggests that the relationship between 
borrowers and lenders is fraught with significant information asymmetries and yet borrower-
specific information is limited. When information asymmetries are severe, prior research has 
found that soft information about borrowers can be useful in lending decisions (Berger & Udell, 
1995, Petersen, 2004). Soft information includes decision useful information which is less 
quantitative and less easily transmitted between decision makers, such as reputation or 
                                                           
16 Mach et al., (2014) performed their analyses over data from Lending Club prior to December 31, 2012 
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personality traits like intelligence and credibility. In the context of financial markets, this soft 
information can take the form of the lexical properties of financial disclosures. 
 In this paper, I choose to study the informational effects of the presence of one lexical 
property in particular: misspelling. I choose to focus on misspelling rather than other types of 
prescriptive language such as grammar, because prior research has shown that misspelling, 
particularly in an electronic communication context, is associated with a number of constructs 
which could affect creditworthiness. Experimental research has established that misspelling 
adversely affects perceptions of intelligence (Figueredo & Varnhagen, 2005, Scott et al., 2014, 
Vignovic & Thompson, 2010), credibility (Everard & Galleta, 2006, Stiff, 2012, Vignovic & 
Thompson, 2010), conscientiousness (Figueredo & Varnhagen, 2005, Everard & Galleta, 2006, 
Vignovic & Thompson, 2010) and employability (Scott et al., 2014). In contrast, grammar errors 
may be less salient to the reader, and may even appear to be more formal than the correct form 
(i.e., hypercorrected forms) (Queen & Boland, 2015).17 
 Lender demand for a given loan is a reflection of the lender’s perception of the 
borrower’s quality. This perception is formed in large part by the hard data available in each 
borrower’s credit report, such as the FICO score, the borrower’s monthly income, or even the 
interest rate that Lending Club assigns to the loan. Lenders in aggregate form beliefs over the 
likelihood of repayment in conjunction with the interest rate on the loan to determine whether 
they would like to invest in the borrower, and if so, in what amount. Given this risk-reward 
tradeoff, some borrowers will naturally appear more attractive to some lenders than others given 
lenders’ varying risk preferences as well as differing models with which individual lenders are 
assessing borrower quality. Because misspellings in loan descriptions may also affect lenders’ 
                                                           
17
 Hypercorrected forms are grammatical errors which violate syntactic constraints but may actually indicate 
increased formality (e.g., “He gave the book to Paul and I.”, “Whom is speaking to me?”) 
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perceptions of borrower quality in terms of some credit risk factor not captured by a credit report 
(e.g., education, conscientiousness, employability), I posit that lender demand is decreasing in 
the number of borrower misspellings. I formalize this hypothesis as follows: 
 H1: Lender demand is negatively related to the incidence of misspelling in the loan 
 description. 
 Lender demand is represented both by a positive choice to invest as well as the decision 
over how much to invest, with larger amounts corresponding to greater demand. In aggregate, 
lender demand can be measured by funding rate, or the number of dollars invested per day, 
assuming that lenders make their decisions somewhat uniformly over time.18 If, on average, 
lender perceptions of borrower quality (holding hard credit report information constant) are 
deteriorating in the number of misspellings in the loan descriptions, then I expect a negative 
relation between funding rate and the number of misspellings in the loan description, controlling 
for other information available to the lenders. Conversely, I also measure lender demand using 
the number of days from the posting of the loan it takes to fully fund the loan. A loan that is in 
higher demand will fund more quickly than a loan that is in lower demand, all else equal. 
Therefore, if lender perceptions of borrower quality (holding hard credit report information 
constant) are deteriorating in the number of misspellings in the loan descriptions, then I expect a 
positive relation between the number of days to fund the loan and the number of misspellings in 
the loan description, controlling for other information available to the lenders. 
 If lenders are making decisions based on the borrowers’ misspellings, then it is 
reasonable to examine the relation between borrower misspellings and ex post loan outcomes. In 
                                                           
18 In my tests, I control for month-to-month heterogeneity in overall lender demand by using Year-Month fixed 
effects.  Therefore, my assumption that lenders make their decisions uniformly over time needs only to hold within 
any given month. 
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assessing borrower type, lenders will review the borrower’s hard credit information, and make 
judgements of the borrower’s creditworthiness based on the information contained therein. 
However, hard credit information such as FICO score, income level and employment history is 
backward looking, and only explains a small proportion of the variation in default probability.19 
Because of this, misspelling may contain soft information that is useful in assessing borrower 
type above and beyond what is contained in the borrower’s hard credit report (Petersen, 2004.) 
Therefore, misspelling could be a predictor of future default, even after taking into account the 
borrower’s hard credit information. 
 Misspelling is related to characteristics which may be related to borrower 
creditworthiness. Prior studies have shown negative relations between misspelling and education 
(Hargittai, 2006) as well as misspelling and intelligence (Kreiner et al., 2002). Furthermore, prior 
research shows that misspelling is strongly correlated with reading disability (Russell, 1955; 
Hinshaw, 1992). Reading disabilities have been linked to both externalizing (e.g., aggression and 
hyperactivity) and internalizing (e.g. anxiety and neuroticism) behavioral problems (Hinshaw, 
1992; Beitchman et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1993), and tend to be persistent, depending on other 
environmental factors (Beitchman et al., 1996; Rutter & Yule, 1975; Spreen, 1988). Consistent 
with these findings, individuals with reading disabilities from all socioeconomic backgrounds 
have poorer educational and occupational outcomes than the non-disabled (Spreen, 1988; Pape et 
al., 2011).  Occupational outcomes and the attendant income disparities have been shown to 
predict delinquency, default, insolvency and bankruptcy (Devaney & Lytton, 1995). That these 
attributes are associated with spelling ability suggests that misspellings in loan descriptions could 
be predictive of loan outcomes. 
                                                           
19 For instance, in my seasoned sample, a model of default regressed on interest rate, FICO and debt-to-income ratio 
explains only 3% of future defaults. 
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 Alternatively, any decreased lender demand for misspellers’ loans could be related to a 
“reverse halo effect”, whereby lenders allow the undesirable misspelling to cloud their judgment 
of overall borrower quality, which may be unrelated (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977.) Indeed, the 
linguistics literature typically seeks to deny that typos and grammar mistakes reveal writer 
characteristics (Queen and Boland, 2015). If misspelling is not related to overall borrower 
quality, then I would expect that ex post loan outcomes would be unrelated to the number of 
misspellings in the loan descriptions. Further, even if misspellings are a signal of borrower 
intelligence and education, actual creditworthiness may not be related to education or 
intelligence (Dunn & Kim, 1999, Boyes et al., 1989), or the predictive power of misspellings 
could be captured by the information in the hard credit report. However, if misspellings reveal 
some additional dimension of borrower quality which constitutes an omitted credit risk factor, 
then it may be an optimal reaction for lenders to fund misspellers’ loans less rapidly. I formalize 
my hypothesis in the alternative form below:  
 H2: Ex post loan outcomes are negatively related to the incidence of misspelling in the 
 loan description. 
 I operationalize ex post loan outcomes using two proxies that are of interest to lenders: 
default and yield. Lenders can only fail to profit on a loan if the borrower defaults, and therefore 
it is important to the lender that the borrower avoids default. At the same time, default does not 
fully capture the profitability of a loan to the lender. The timing of the default, as well as the loss 
given default, also determines how profitable or unprofitable the loan is. Therefore, I view 
positive ex post loan outcomes (from the perspective of the lender) as lower incidence of default 
as well as higher yield to the lenders. Consequently, if there is a positive relation between the 
number of borrower misspellings and the probability of default, and a negative relation between 
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the number of borrower misspellings and the yield to lenders, then misspellings are a valid signal 
of borrower quality. 
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Chapter III: Sample and Data
 
 In this study I analyze data from the dataset which is freely available from Lending 
Club’s website.20 The sample includes all loans posted for funding by Lending Club from their 
inception in June of 2007 through November of 2013. Figure 1 contains an example of the set of 
information made available to a lender when considering a particular loan. This includes loan 
characteristics, borrower characteristics, borrower credit history, and the focus of the study, the 
loan description.21 I track misspellings which occur in this section of the loan profile. Because I 
am interested in the value of misspellings as a signal of borrower quality, I am interested only in 
the effects of misspelling only on those borrowers who choose to complete loan descriptions.22 
Therefore, I perform my demand tests only over the 103,344 loans with descriptions. To test the 
effects of misspelling on loan outcomes, I further restrict the sample to all loans issued in 
November, 2011 or earlier, in order to allow the loans to become “seasoned.” I do this to ensure 
that I am only testing loans which have had a reasonable amount of time from issuance to 
default.23 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the loans split into all loans, and loans which 
have been “seasoned.” 
                                                           
20 This data can be downloaded at https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action. The data used in this 
study was downloaded on January 23, 2014. 
21 This however, does not include any information about the lenders. 
22 I exclude loans without loan descriptions because I am interested in the effects of misspelling on those who 
misspell, i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated. While the choice to disclose or not to disclose is 
interesting, it is outside of the scope of this paper. 
23 Lending Club defines a seasoned loan as a loan which has matured at least 10 months. Because default occurs a 
minimum of five months after dispersal of loan funds, I choose a more restrictive definition of a seasoned loan as a 
loan which has matured at least 24 months. 
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Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables for testing my hypotheses are dollars invested per day by lenders 
(FUND_PER_DAY); days between listing and issuance of the loan (FUND_DAYS); default 
(DEFAULT); and net loan yield (RETURNS). Dollars invested per day is calculated as the total 
amount of funding supplied by lenders for a particular loan divided by the number of days 
between loan listing and loan funding. The mean (median) funding rate for my sample is $1,890 
($1,429) dollars per day, with a standard deviation of $1,680. The mean (median) number of 
days between loan listing and loan funding is 9.08 days (8 days) with a standard deviation of 
4.65 days. Default is an indicator variable which is set to one when a loan is either listed as 
charged off or in default as of the download date. 11.8% of the loans in my seasoned sample 
went into default. Net loan yield is calculated as the internal rate of return of the loan assuming 
that all payments were received by the lenders uniformly over the length of the loan. The mean 
(median) yield in the sample is 4.2% (11.7%), and the standard deviation of lender yield is 
27.5%. 
Loan Characteristics 
 The loans that Lending Club facilitates have three dimensions: amount (LOAN_AMT), 
duration (60_MONTH) and interest rate (INT_RATE). Mean (median) loan size in the sample is 
$13,750 ($12,000), and the standard deviation of loan size is $7,964.24 The variable 60_MONTH 
is an indicator set to one if the duration of the loan is five years, or zero if the duration is three 
years. 77% of sample loans have three year terms, and the remaining 23% have five year terms. 
Mean (median) interest rate (INT_RATE) in the sample is 13.4% (13.1%), with a standard 
deviation of 4.3%. Due to the rapid growth of this market, the loans in the sample are weighted 
                                                           
24 For parsimony, I report only the descriptive statistics of the full sample here. Descriptive statistics for the 
seasoned sample are available in Table 1. 
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towards the end of the sample period. The number of months between the beginning of the 
sample period and the loan application date (LIST_MONTH) indicates that the mean (median) 
loan in the sample was listed in June, 2012 (October, 2012), while the 25th percentile is in 
December of 2011. 
Borrower Characteristics 
 Lending Club provides to the lenders a few personal characteristics of their borrowers 
which are potentially related to their creditworthiness, including length of employment 
(EMP_LENGTH), monthly income (INCOME), whether Lending Club has verified that income 
(VERIFIED) and the ratio of monthly debt payments to monthly income (DTI). The mean 
(median) employment length in the sample is 6.5 (6) years, with a standard deviation of 3.8 
years. Mean (median) monthly income for borrowers in the sample is $5,962 ($5,083), with a 
standard deviation of $4,513, and 63.2% of borrowers had their income verified by Lending 
Club. The mean (median) debt-to-income ratio in the sample is 16.1% (15.9%) with a standard 
deviation of 21.4%. 
Borrower Credit History 
 Most of the data which Lending Club procures from the borrower and provides to the 
lender concerns the borrower’s credit history. A borrower’s loan description includes 
information about accounts currently delinquent (DELINQUENT), how much is currently 
delinquent (DELINQ_AMT), the number of delinquencies in the last two years (DELINQ_2YRS) 
and the time since the borrower’s most recent delinquency (TIME_SINCE_DELINQ). Current 
delinquencies are virtually nonexistent, with a mean amount currently delinquent across the 
sample of $5. The average borrower in the sample has had 0.2 delinquencies in the previous two 
years, and the mean (median) borrower has had a delinquency in the past 10 years (never). 
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 In addition to information on delinquency, the loan listings provide the borrower’s FICO 
score (FICO) which is a one-size-fits-all summary statistic for the borrower’s credit history. The 
mean (median) FICO score for borrowers in the sample is 703 (695), which is reflective of the 
sample containing prime and near-prime borrowers. Also listed are the borrower’s months of 
credit history (CREDIT_HIST), the number of credit inquiries in the last six months 
(INQUIRIES), the number of public records such as bankruptcies and liens (PUB_RECORD) as 
well as the time since the borrower’s most recent record (TIME_SINCE_RECORD). The average 
borrower in the sample has 15 years of credit history. Inquiries are somewhat common, with a 
mean number of inquiries of 0.83. Public records are far less common, with a mean number of 
records of 0.08. 
 The listing also includes the total balance of the borrower’s revolving credit accounts 
(e.g. credit cards) (REV_BAL) and the percentage of the credit limits that are being used 
(REV_UTIL). Lastly, the loan listing provides the number of credit accounts that the borrower 
currently has open (OPEN_ACC) as well as the total number of credit accounts the borrower has 
ever had (TOTAL_ACC). For the sample, the mean (median) borrower has a revolving balance of 
$15,816 ($11,788), which constitutes 55.7% (58.2%) of his credit limit, and has had 24 (22) lines 
of credit, of which 10.6 (10) are open at the time of the loan application. 
Loan Description Characteristics 
The variable of interest in this study is the number of misspellings (MSPL) contained in 
the loan descriptions. In order to count the number of misspellings, I remove all text in the loan 
description that is not provided by the borrower (e.g., text appended by Lending Club.) I then use 
the Lingua::EN::Fathom module in Perl to count the number of words within each loan 
description which do not match the internal dictionary of the module. This variable is denoted as 
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MSPL. Note that because this procedure for detecting misspellings works in much the same way 
as a word processor’s spell checker, it does not recognize homophonic spelling errors (i.e., errors 
in the form of words which are also in the dictionary as in their instead of there). To the extent 
that these homophonic spelling errors are present in the loan descriptions, and they affect 
lenders’ perceptions of borrower quality, my tests likely understate the impact of misspellings.25 
The mean number of misspellings in a loan description is 0.28. 8.9% of all loan descriptions 
feature at least one misspelling, and 2.7% of all loan descriptions contain more than one 
misspelling. 
 In addition to the number of misspellings in each loan description, I also consider two 
alternative specifications for misspellings. First, I consider the square root of the number of 
misspellings, SQRT_MSPL, to account for the possibility that successive misspellings are 
decreasingly consequential. Second, I consider the percentage of words misspelled, PCT_MSPL, 
to account for the possibility that misspellings relative to the size of the loan description (in total 
number of words) is what influences lenders’ perceptions of borrower quality. On average, 1.0% 
of all words in a loan description are misspelled. In untabulated tests, I find that my results are 
qualitatively unaffected by the choice of misspelling specification.  
 I use the same module in Perl to obtain an overall word count for each loan description 
(WORDS) and to compute the Gunning-Fog Index (FOG) and Flesch-Kincaid grade level score 
(KINCAID), two measures that will be used as control variables in my tests. The mean (median) 
number of words in a loan description for the sample is 38 (26). The mean (median) Fog Index in 
the sample is 10.3 (9.8), indicating that the average loan description requires approximately 10 
years of education to read. The mean (median) Flesch-Kincaid index for loan descriptions in the 
                                                           
25 In an experimental study, Figueredo & Varnhagen (2005) find that homophonic spelling errors are judged less 
harshly than non-homophonic errors. If this also holds in peer-to-peer lending settings, then the effects of 
homophonic spelling errors are likely to be less consequential. 
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sample is 7.8 (8.3) indicating that an 8th grader could read the average loan description (Li, 
2008).  
 Table 2 provides the univariate correlations for selected variables, including each 
dependent variable, each loan description characteristic, loan amount, interest rate, list month, 
employment length, monthly income and FICO score. In the univariate, I find that misspelling is 
strongly (p<.001) negatively correlated with funding rate, strongly positively correlated with 
default, and strongly negatively correlated with net yield to lenders. The size of the correlation 
between misspelling and funding rate is smaller than those of interest rate, employment length or 
income, suggesting that misspelling is not as much of a driver of lender demand as these other 
variables. On the other hand, the correlation between misspelling and default is among the 
largest univariate correlations between any variable and default, and it is the same as the 
correlation between interest rate and default. This suggests that misspelling is as accurate of a 
predictor of default as the result of Lending Club’s algorithmic prediction of loan risk, the 
assigned interest rate. 
 I provide the results of a construct validity test of associations with my MSPL variable in 
Table 3. Borrowers are more likely to misspell if they write a longer description, or if the grade 
level at which they are writing is higher.  I also find that misspellings are more likely for 
borrowers with higher interest rates and lower FICO scores. This provides some comfort that 
misspellings are measuring some dimension of low borrower quality. Along these lines, I find 
that misspellings are also negatively related to borrower income, yet they are also positively 
related to employment length. This could suggest that the type of person who is prone to misspell 
finds career advancement to be difficult.
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Chapter IV: Research Design and Results
 
 I use OLS regressions to test the effect of misspellings on the level of funding per day 
(my first proxy for lender demand) in a posted price setting. The regression includes each control 
variable included in Appendix A, as well as indicator variables for loan purpose (e.g., Credit 
Card Refinancing, Home Improvement), indicator variables for home ownership type (e.g., Own, 
Mortgage) and indicator variables for each combination of state, year and month in which a 
borrower applied for a loan (e.g., Alabama, 2009, March.) I use State-Year-Month fixed effects 
in order to control for potential heterogeneity among investor bases from month to month or 
from state to state. Standard errors are clustered by State-Year-Month26. In functional form: 
	
 =  +  + + 	
		 +  ! 
The coefficient of interest in this model is .  
 Table 4 includes the results of this regression without the loan description characteristics 
(1), with loan description characteristics other than misspelling (2), and the full model including 
misspellings (3). I find that misspellings are strongly negatively related to funding rate, with the 
marginal effect of each misspelling decreasing funding rate by $30 dollars per day. This 
represents a decrease of 2% relative to the median funding rate of $1,429 per day. I find that, as 
in Gao & Lin (2013), the Gunning-Fog index is negatively associated with lender demand, while 
the Flesch-Kincaid ease-of-read score is positively related to lender demand.  The effect of 
misspelling on lender demand is similar in magnitude to the effects of a one-standard deviation 
                                                           
26
 This results in 2,927 clusters, allowing me to make valid inferences while simultaneously allowing for errors to be 
correlated across time and location. 
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increase in Fog Index ($24/day) or a decrease in the Flesch-Kincaid ease of read ($40/day), and 
indicates that each of the three affect lender demand in different ways. I also find that each 
additional word in a loan description increases funding rate by about $0.35 per day. This finding 
is in keeping with the results of Michels (2012) which showed that additional disclosures within 
the borrower’s loan description were positively associated with lender demand.  
With respect to loan characteristics, I find that interest rate is positively related to funding 
rate, which suggests that lenders in this market are more risk tolerant than the Lending Club 
pricing algorithm. The duration of the loans issued to the borrower is significantly positively 
related to funding rate, suggesting that lenders in this area prefer longer cash flow streams and 
are tolerant of duration risk. I find that loan amount is highly positively related to funding rate. 
Given the proxy of dollars funded per day, I believe this relation is mechanical. 
As I would expect, among borrower characteristics, employment length and income are 
positively related to funding rate, while debt-to-income is negatively related to funding rate. 
However, a borrower having had his income verified by Lending Club is strongly statistically 
and economically negatively related to funding rate, with a decrease in funding rate of $226 per 
day. This could be because lenders are aware that Lending Club chooses those borrowers which 
are verified, most likely for reasons which indicate that those borrowers are less creditworthy.  
 Most of the borrower credit history variables show significant associations with funding 
rate in ways that I would expect based on common understanding of the effects of those variables 
on creditworthiness. Delinquencies in the prior two years, number of credit inquiries in the prior 
six months, number of public records and revolving credit balance each are considered 
detrimental to a borrower’s creditworthiness, and each is negatively related to funding rate. 
Similarly, time since delinquency and the number of open accounts are considered positive 
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indicators of creditworthiness, and each is positively related to funding rate. However, I find that 
credit history and FICO score are each negatively related to funding rate, while the percentage of 
available credit being utilized is positively related to funding rate. I believe these findings could 
be explained by lenders giving those borrowers with short credit history the benefit of the doubt 
relative to other creditors, lenders viewing FICO as inadequate in this setting given its “one-size-
fits-all” approach, and lenders viewing high credit utilization as verification that the borrower 
will use the proceeds of the loan to pay off debt, as most borrowers claim. 
In addition to the OLS regression over funding per day, I also use a set of Cox 
proportional hazard models over the number of days it takes to fund the loan in order to assess 
misspelling’s effects on lender demand. The models include each of the independent variables 
from the loan description characteristics, the loan characteristics, the borrower characteristics 
and the borrower’s credit history. I also control for the purpose of the loan and the borrower’s 
residential status. I use Year-Month fixed effects to control for potential heterogeneity in the 
lender base from month to month, and my standard errors are clustered by State-Year-Month. 
The results of the Cox proportional hazard models are presented in Table 5 without the 
loan description characteristics (1), with loan description characteristics other than misspelling 
(2), and the full model including misspellings (3). Model coefficients are presented in such a way 
that negative numbers indicate a decrease in the rate of “failure” (in this case, full funding of the 
loan.) I find that each misspelling is associated with a 2.6% increase in the amount of time that it 
takes to fund a loan on average. I find that a one standard deviation decrease in Flesch-Kincaid 
ease of read is associated with a 1.9% increase in time to fund, but that Fog Index is not 
significantly associated with time to fund, in contrast with Gao & Lin (2013). I also find that a 
one standard deviation increase in the number of words written in the description is associated 
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with a 1.7% decrease in the time it takes to fund the loan, consistent with the findings in Michels 
(2012). 
With respect to loan characteristics, I find that interest rate is negatively related to time to 
fund, which further indicates that lenders in this market are risk tolerant. Loan duration is 
significantly positively related to time to fund, contradicting the results in the funding rate tests, 
and suggesting that lenders in this area are not tolerant of duration risk. I find that loan amount is 
highly positively related to time to fund. Because it would necessarily require more lender 
money to fill a larger loan, I believe this relation is largely mechanical. 
Among borrower characteristics, employment length and income are negatively related to 
time to fund, as lenders prefer borrowers who exhibit strong, stable earning power. As in the 
funding rate test, a borrower having had his income verified by Lending Club is strongly 
statistically and economically positively related to time to fund, with an increase in time to fund 
of 25.7%. This suggests that lenders are aware that borrowers are chosen for verification based 
on their creditworthiness.  
 Most of the borrower credit history variables show significant relations with time to fund 
in ways that I would expect. Delinquencies in the prior two years, number of credit inquiries in 
the prior six months, number of public records and revolving credit balance each are considered 
detrimental to a borrower’s creditworthiness, and each is positively related to time to fund. 
Similarly, time since delinquency, total number of accounts and the number of open accounts are 
considered positive indicators of creditworthiness, and each is negatively related to time to fund. 
Again, I find that credit history is positively related to time to fund, while the percentage of 
available credit being utilized is negatively related to time to fund. As suggested in the 
discussion of Table 4, I believe these findings could be explained by lenders giving those 
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borrowers with short credit history the benefit of the doubt relative to other creditors, and lenders 
viewing high credit utilization as verification that the borrower will use the proceeds of the loan 
to pay off debt, as most borrowers claim. 
 To examine the relation between misspellings and default, I use OLS regressions with 
State-Year-Month clustering and fixed effects. I chose to use a linear probability model rather 
than a probit model in order to make the results more interpretable and to allow for the use of 
fixed effects.27 The model can be represented as: 
	 =  +  + + 	
		 +  ! 
The coefficient of interest in this model is .  
 Table 6 includes the results of this regression without the loan description characteristics 
(1), with loan description characteristics other than misspelling (2), and the full model including 
misspellings (3). I find that misspellings strongly predict future default. Each misspelling 
increases the marginal probability that a loan will default by 0.8%. The regressions show that, as 
in Gao & Lin (2013), Flesch-Kincaid ease-of-read is negatively related to default, while there is 
a weakly positive relation between Gunning-Fog index and default. The coefficient on 
misspellings in Model 3 represents an increase of 7% in the default rate per misspelling, relative 
to the average default rate of 11.8% across my sample. This effect is on the order of the effect of 
a one-standard deviation decrease in the Flesch-Kincaid ease of read (1.3%) or a one-standard 
deviation increase in Gunning-Fog index (1.0%).  I find that the number of words in the loan 
description is statistically significantly negatively related to the incidence of default, which is 
consistent with the Michels (2012) finding that the number of textual disclosures is negatively 
related to default.  
                                                           
27 Untabulated results from estimating default tests using probit without fixed effects are similar in economic and 
statistical significance. 
28 
 
Unsurprisingly, I find that interest rate and longer loan term are positively related to 
default. Each of these variables represents different aspects of loan risk, and is expected to be 
positively related to default. Consistent with the magnitudes of the univariate correlations in 
Table 2, I find that the economic effect of one misspelling on default rate (.008) is almost a 
quarter as large as that of a one standard deviation increase in interest rate (.036). Similarly 
unsurprisingly, among borrower characteristics, I find that income is negatively related to 
default.  
Regarding borrower credit history, FICO is negatively associated with default while 
recent credit inquiries and revolving account utilization are positively associated with default. 
Each of these results is expected based on common perceptions of these variables’ effects on 
creditworthiness. However, time since the most recent delinquency is strongly positively related 
to default.28 This result is counterintuitive, and may be because recent delinquencies are 
impounded too strongly in variables such as FICO and interest rate in terms of predicting credit 
risk in this particular market. 
In order to assess the effects of misspelling on both default and loss given default, I use 
OLS regressions to test the effect of misspellings on the net yield to lenders. The regression 
includes each control variable, indicator variables for loan purpose, indicator variables for home 
ownership type and State-Year-Month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by State-Year-
Month. In functional form: 
 =  +  + + 	
		 +  ! 
The coefficient of interest in this model is . 
                                                           
28
 As TIME_SINCE_DELINQ is an ordered categorical variable, I denoted those loans with no delinquencies 
reported as having the highest value possible, therefore this result is not an artifact of those without delinquencies 
being removed. 
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 Table 7 includes the results of this regression without the loan description characteristics 
(1), with loan description characteristics other than misspelling (2), and the full model including 
misspellings (3). I find that misspellings are strongly predictive of lower returns. On average, the 
marginal effect of each misspelling on lender yield is a decrease of 0.64%. This represents a 
relative decrease of 15% relative to the median return of 4.2% across my sample. I find that, 
consistent with Gao & Lin (2013), the Gunning-Fog index is negatively associated with lender 
yield, while the Flesch-Kincaid ease-of-read score is positively related to lender yield. The 
magnitude of the effect of one misspelling on lender yield is approximately half of the effect of a 
one-standard deviation increase in Fog Index (1.3%) or a one-standard deviation decrease in the 
Flesch-Kincaid ease of read (1.5%). Consistent with Michels (2012) findings that additional 
textual disclosures are associated with improved loan outcomes, I find that each additional word 
written in a loan description predicts an additional 1.3 basis points in lender yield. 
With respect to loan characteristics, I find that loan duration is negatively related to 
lender yield. This suggests that Lending Club’s pricing algorithm over the sample time period 
underweighted duration risk. I also find that interest rate is strongly related to lender yield, which 
suggests an appropriate relation between risk and return. As one might expect, borrower monthly 
income is strongly positively associated with lender yield, and debt-to-income and income 
verification are strongly negatively associated with lender yield.  
Several of the borrower’s credit history variables show coefficients that one might expect 
based on the common perceptions of their effects on creditworthiness. For instance, the number 
of recent inquiries and the number of public records are strongly negatively related to investor 
yield.  
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Chapter V: Additional Analysis
 
 In order to investigate which loan listing characteristics affect the relations between 
misspelling and loan demand, and misspelling and loan outcomes, I perform a number of cross-
sectional partitions on the Lending Club data. I partition the data into top- and bottom-terciles for 
each of the following variables: interest rate, FICO, length of credit history, total number of 
credit accounts ever held by the borrower, employment length and income. Over each of these 
partitions, I perform the four empirical tests noted in Section IV of this paper, namely OLS 
regressions with State-Year-Month clustering and fixed effects for FUND_PER_DAY, 
DEFAULT and RETURNS, and a Cox Proportional Hazard Model with State-Year-Month 
clustering and Year-Month fixed effects for FUND_DAYS. The results of these tests partitioned 
by employment length, income and interest rate are in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10, 
respectively, while the remaining tests are untabulated for parsimony. 
 With regard to lender demand, the cross-sectional tests reveal that misspellings 
negatively impact lender demand regardless of the situation, as evidence in each of Table 8, 
Table 9 and Table 10 suggests. This is consistent with the view that, from an ex ante lender’s 
perspective, the misspellings are perceived with a “reverse halo effect” (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977.) On average, the lenders do not know specifically why they view the misspeller’s loan 
listing as less desirable, just that in all circumstances, they do view the misspeller’s loan listing 
as less desirable. Alternatively, the consistency with which misspellings decrease lender demand 
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could be because each lender perceives the misspeller to be flawed from a credit risk standpoint 
in the lender’s own way. 
 In contrast to the findings specific to lender demand, I find several key factors which 
attenuate or exacerbate the predictive power of misspellings in terms of loan outcomes. The 
relations between misspelling and default and between misspelling and lender yield are 
attenuated by the ability of the borrower to keep a job and generate income. Table 8 shows that 
for borrowers with a long employment history at their current job, misspelling is not predictive 
of default or decreased lender yield. Similarly, Table 9 suggests that high levels of borrower 
income mitigate the incremental contribution of misspelling to actual credit risk, as there is no 
relation between misspelling and default or misspelling and lender yields in the high income 
group. These findings suggest that misspelling reveals something about the borrower’s future 
ability to pay off his debt (e.g., employability, intelligence, education and conscientiousness) 
more so than the borrower’s willingness to do so (e.g., credibility).  
In a somewhat contrasting finding, Table 10 shows that the effect of misspelling on loan 
outcome variables is modulated by the interest rate. These tests show that misspellings predict 
loan outcomes only when the borrower’s interest rate is relatively low. That misspellings only 
predict creditworthiness for those loans with lower interest rates may suggest that Lending 
Club’s underwriting process may be partially selecting on the dimension of creditworthiness that 
misspelling captures, by offering riskier borrowers less risky loans. Alternatively, these findings 
could indicate that the underwriting process is capturing the dimension of creditworthiness 
revealed through misspelling only for some borrowers, and therefore inappropriately providing 
low rates for other borrowers who misspell. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
 
 In this study, I find that misspelling in the loan description section of a borrower’s loan 
listing is associated with a decrease in funding rate from lenders, an increase in the time it takes 
to fully fund a loan, an increased incidence of default, and lower net yield to lenders. These 
findings are consistent with my hypotheses that misspellings lead to decreased lender demand, 
and that misspellings are a signal of low borrower quality, distinct from the hard information 
provided in a credit profile. These results are also consistent with prior work in social 
psychology which suggests that misspellings can affect perceptions of conscientiousness, 
competence and employability, or even that misspellings exhibit a “reverse halo effect.” The 
results of additional analyses also suggest that the relation between misspellings and loan 
outcomes is driven by characteristics which affect ability to pay (e.g., employability, 
intelligence, education and conscientiousness), rather than willingness to pay (e.g., credibility). 
 To my knowledge my paper is the first to demonstrate that the lexical properties of 
writing in financial disclosures signal the communicator’s quality, rather than merely impeding 
communication. My paper is also the first study to establish that misspellings predict the future 
performance of the misspelling party. Given that prior research has established that misspellings 
affect perceptions of misspellers, this finding fills an important gap in the spelling literature. This 
paper contributes to the literature on peer-to-peer lending by demonstrating that the information 
transmitted by misspelling is useful; misspellings help alleviate information asymmetry. With 
regard to the household finance literature, my work shows that proper spelling is important in 
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retail lending contexts, for both borrowers and lenders. Finally, although my study is set in the 
distinctive peer-to-peer lending setting, my findings suggest that misspellings in disclosures are 
consequential in settings where information asymmetries are important and reliable information 
is limited.
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Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 Std Dev N Mean P25 Median P75 Std Dev
Dependent Variables
FUND_PER_DAY 103,344 $1,890 $850 $1,429 $2,400 $1,680 25,700   $1,326 $686 $1,120 $1,678 $1,032
FUND_DAYS 103,344 9.08 6 8 12 4.65 25,700   9.17 6 9 13 4.30
DEFAULT 103,344 5.2% 0 0 0 22.3% 25,700   11.8% 0 0 0 32.2%
RETURNS 103,344 9.6% 9.6% 13.4% 17.2% 21.6% 25,700   4.2% 7.1% 11.7% 15.6% 27.5%
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 103,344 13.750 7.750 12.000 19.000 7.964 25,700   11.500 6.000 10.000 15.000 7.375
60_MONTH 103,344 22.8% 0 0 0 42.0% 25,700   25.9% 0 0 1 43.8%
INT_RATE 103,344 13.4% 10.2% 13.1% 16.2% 4.3% 25,700   12.0% 9.3% 11.9% 14.3% 3.6%
LIST_MONTH 103,344 61.0 55 65 72 14.8 25,700   39.3 32 42 49 12.0
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 103,344 6.5 3 6 11 3.8 25,700   5.7 3 5 9 3.6
INCOME 103,344 5.962 3.750 5.083 7.083 4.513 25,700   5.781 3.417 5.000 6.917 4.968
VERIFIED 103,344 63.2% 0 1 1 48.2% 25,700   52.7% 0 1 1 49.9%
DTI 103,344 16.1% 10.5% 15.9% 21.4% 7.5% 25,700   13.3% 8.1% 13.4% 18.6% 6.7%
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT 103,344 0% 0 0 0 4% 25,700   0% 0 0 0 0%
DELINQ_AMT 103,344 0.005 0 0 0 0.431 25,700   0.000 0 0 0 0.000
DELINQ_2YRS 103,344 0.20 0 0 0 0.62 25,700   0.14 0 0 0 0.48
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 103,344 9.9 4 14 14 5.3 25,700   10.4 5 14 14 5.1
CREDIT_HIST 103,344 180 124 164 221 84 25,700   164 108 149 203 81
FICO 103,344 703 680 695 720 33 25,700   716 685 710 740 36
INQUIRIES 103,344 0.83 0 0 1 1.05 25,700   0.89 0 1 1 1.09
TIME_SINCE_RECORD 103,344 11.7 12 12 12 1.2 25,700   11.8 12 12 12 1.0
PUB_RECORD 103,344 0.08 0 0 0 0.31 25,700   0.06 0 0 0 0.24
REV_BAL 103,344 15.816 6.353 11.788 20.065 19.100 25,700   13.590 3.771 8.961 17.286 16.041
REV_UTIL 103,344 55.7% 37.9% 58.2% 75.7% 25.0% 25,700   48.1% 24.8% 48.2% 71.4% 28.2%
OPEN_ACC 103,344 10.6 7 10 13 4.6 25,700   9.4 6 9 12 4.4
TOTAL_ACC 103,344 24.0 16 22 31 11.2 25,700   22.2 14 21 29 11.4
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL 103,344 0.28 0 0 0 0.78 25,700   0.50 0 0 1 1.13
SQRT_MSPL 103,344 0.22 0 0 0 0.49 25,700   0.35 0 0 1 0.61
PCT_MSPL 103,344 1.0% 0 0 0 4.0% 25,700   1.0% 0 0 0.7% 3.6%
WORDS 103,344 38.0 11 26 50 44.2 25,700   65.1 18 44 86.5 70.7
FOG 103,344 10.3 7.9 9.8 12.7 5.3 25,700   10.2 8 10 12.6 5.0
KINCAID 103,344 8.3 5.6 7.8 10.2 4.8 25,700   8.2 5.9 8 10.2 4.3
All Sample Loans Seasoned Loans Only
Summary Statistics
Table 1
FUND_PER_DAY  is the amount, in dollars per day, invested in the loan by investors through LendingClub's website. FUND_DAYS  is the number of days that it 
takes the loan to be fully funded. DEFAULT  is an indicator variable for whether the loan ended in default. RETURNS  is net yield to the investors (before fees) in 
percentage terms. LOAN_AMT  is the size of the loan in thousands of dollars. 60_MONTH  is an indicator variable for whether the loan is for 60 months. 0 indicates a 
36 month loan. INT_RATE  is the stated interest rate of the loan, in percentage terms. LIST_MONTH  is months since beginning of data set at time of application. 
EMP_LENGTH  is an ordered categorical variable for length of employment at current employer at time of application. INCOME  is borrower submitted monthly 
income in thousands of dollars per month. VERIFIED  is an indicator of whether borrower employment information is confirmed by LendingClub. DTI  is debt-to-
income ratio at time of application. DELINQUENT  is an indicator of whether any of borrowers credit accounts are delinquent at time of application. DELINQ_AMT 
is the amount of debt on borrower's credit report that is delinquent at time of application. DELINQ_2YRS  is the number of delinquencies reported on borrower's 
credit report within the last two years at the time of application. TIME_SINCE_DELINQ  is an ordered categorical variable for time since last delinquency on 
borrower's credit report at time of application, where lower numbers indicate more recent delinquency. CREDIT_HIST  is the length of borrower credit history, in 
months at time of application. FICO  is borrower's FICO score at time of application. INQUIRIES  is the number of hard credit inquiries on borrower's credit report 
within the last six months at time of application. PUB_RECORD  is the number of public records on borrower's credit report at time of application. 
TIME_SINCE_RECORD  is an ordered categorical variable for time since last public record on borrower's credit report at time of application, where lower numbers 
indicate more recent record.  REV_BAL  is the amount of revolving debt in thousands of dollars on borrower's credit report at time of application. REV_UTIL  is the 
percentage of credit limit on revolving accounts being used by borrower at time of application. OPEN_ACC  is the number of open credit accounts held by the 
borrower at time of application. TOTAL_ACC  is the number of credit accounts ever held by the borrower at time of application. MSPL  is the number of misspellings 
within the text of the borrower submitted loan description. SQRT_MSPL  is the square root of the number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted 
loan description. PCT_MSPL  is the number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted loan description divided by the total number of words in the 
description. WORDS  is the total number of words in the borrower submitted loan description. FOG  is Fog Index of the borrower submitted loan description. 
KINCAID  is the Flesch-Kincaid ease of reading index, which is increasing in sentence length and syllables per word. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) FUND_PER_DAY 1.000 -0.525 -0.077 0.178 -0.043 -0.021 0.047 0.051 0.680 0.186 0.307 0.166 0.352 -0.018
(2) FUND_DAYS -0.473 1.000 0.055 -0.021 0.037 0.029 0.009 0.004 0.195 -0.008 -0.153 -0.029 0.045 0.087
(3) DEFAULT -0.066 0.048 1.000 -0.376 0.053 0.051 0.000 -0.003 -0.025 0.064 -0.204 -0.032 -0.062 -0.032
(4) RETURNS 0.096 -0.043 -0.904 1.000 -0.018 -0.049 0.000 0.004 0.190 0.811 0.166 0.042 0.022 -0.534
(5) MSPL -0.042 0.027 0.058 -0.046 1.000 0.281 0.038 0.045 -0.010 -0.006 -0.156 0.001 -0.023 0.023
(6) WORDS -0.062 0.028 0.066 -0.054 0.361 1.000 0.115 0.143 0.012 -0.061 -0.297 -0.101 -0.021 0.072
(7) FOG 0.033 0.010 -0.002 0.003 0.041 0.080 1.000 0.918 0.066 -0.003 -0.012 -0.039 0.087 0.026
(8) KINCAID 0.043 0.004 -0.006 0.008 0.043 0.083 0.922 1.000 0.066 -0.003 -0.021 -0.050 0.078 0.026
(9) LOAN_AMT 0.547 0.178 -0.022 0.075 -0.010 -0.013 0.056 0.062 1.000 0.214 0.190 0.167 0.472 0.072
(10) INT_RATE 0.191 0.006 0.058 0.161 -0.008 -0.057 0.011 0.012 0.268 1.000 0.171 0.048 -0.003 -0.669
(11) LIST_MONTH 0.278 -0.100 -0.195 0.169 -0.150 -0.347 0.018 0.018 0.194 0.190 1.000 0.138 0.090 -0.211
(12) EMP_LENGTH 0.131 -0.025 -0.033 0.035 -0.004 -0.097 -0.020 -0.024 0.160 0.051 0.148 1.000 0.186 -0.009
(13) INCOME 0.187 0.046 -0.039 0.039 -0.016 -0.016 0.052 0.046 0.340 0.007 0.040 0.106 1.000 0.094
(14) FICO -0.031 0.060 -0.032 -0.107 0.024 0.076 0.018 0.010 0.057 -0.636 -0.208 -0.009 0.079 1.000
Bolded correlation coefficients are significant at the p<.001 level.
Table 2
Univariate Correlations
FUND_PER_DAY  is the amount, in dollars per day, invested in the loan by investors through LendingClub's website. FUND_DAYS  is the number of 
days that it takes the loan to be fully funded. DEFAULT  is an indicator variable for whether the loan ended in default. RETURNS  is net yield to the 
investors (before fees) in percentage terms. MSPL  is the number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted loan description. WORDS  is the 
total number of words in the borrower submitted loan description. FOG  is Fog Index of the borrower submitted loan description. KINCAID  is the Flesch-
Kincaid ease of reading index, which is increasing in sentence length and syllables per word. LOAN_AMT  is the size of the loan in thousands of dollars. 
INT_RATE  is the stated interest rate of the loan, in percentage terms. LIST_MONTH  is months since beginning of data set at time of application. 
EMP_LENGTH  is an ordered categorical variable for length of employment at current employer at time of application. INCOME  is borrower submitted 
monthly income in thousands of dollars per month. FICO  is borrower's FICO score at time of application. 
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VARIABLES Dependent Variable: MSPL
Loan Description Characteristics
WORDS 0.006***
(37.96)
FOG -0.000
(-0.48)
KINCAID 0.003***
(3.01)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT -0.000
(-1.00)
60_MONTH 0.016**
(2.08)
INT_RATE 0.004***
(4.38)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 0.007***
(11.85)
INCOME -0.002***
(-3.12)
VERIFIED -0.001
(-0.21)
DTI -0.000
(-0.31)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -0.058**
(-2.46)
DELINQ_AMT -0.005***
(-3.42)
DELINQ_2YRS -0.005
(-1.25)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ -0.000
(-0.75)
CREDIT_HIST 0.000***
(4.48)
FICO -0.000***
(-4.04)
INQUIRIES 0.001
(0.52)
PUB_RECORD 0.020
(1.41)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD 0.003
(0.85)
REV_BAL -0.000
(-0.61)
REV_UTIL -0.103***
(-7.30)
OPEN_ACC -0.004***
(-5.98)
TOTAL_ACC 0.001*
(1.87)
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 103,344
Pseudo R-squared 0.106
Year-Month clustered z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3
Determinants of Misspelling
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -29.563***
(-6.10)
WORDS 0.172 0.354***
(1.58) (2.96)
FOG -4.518** -4.573**
(-2.38) (-2.41)
KINCAID 8.239*** 8.367***
(3.82) (3.88)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 110.618*** 110.457*** 110.461***
(66.81) (66.99) (67.01)
60_MONTH 37.371* 36.170* 36.615*
(1.70) (1.65) (1.67)
INT_RATE 7.980*** 8.112*** 8.194***
(3.20) (3.25) (3.29)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 10.744*** 10.986*** 11.185***
(8.76) (8.97) (9.13)
INCOME 2.082* 2.027* 1.960
(1.74) (1.70) (1.64)
VERIFIED -226.023*** -225.905*** -226.089***
(-17.98) (-17.96) (-17.98)
DTI -2.833*** -2.789*** -2.775***
(-4.49) (-4.42) (-4.40)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -89.681 -90.508 -92.243
(-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.95)
DELINQ_AMT -0.608 -0.356 -0.512
(-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.09)
DELINQ_2YRS -26.709*** -27.152*** -27.319***
(-3.44) (-3.50) (-3.51)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 2.411** 2.403** 2.403**
(2.47) (2.46) (2.46)
CREDIT_HIST -0.433*** -0.428*** -0.425***
(-7.96) (-7.89) (-7.83)
FICO -0.588** -0.584** -0.605**
(-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.41)
INQUIRIES -16.870*** -16.916*** -16.940***
(-3.74) (-3.75) (-3.76)
PUB_RECORD -75.705*** -75.791*** -75.261***
(-2.60) (-2.60) (-2.58)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD 4.820 4.715 4.798
(0.64) (0.63) (0.64)
REV_BAL -1.506*** -1.510*** -1.515***
(-6.02) (-6.04) (-6.07)
REV_UTIL 138.836*** 138.415*** 135.769***
(6.16) (6.14) (6.02)
OPEN_ACC 10.164*** 10.087*** 9.975***
(7.27) (7.22) (7.15)
TOTAL_ACC 0.439 0.457 0.468
(0.78) (0.81) (0.83)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 103,344 103,344 103,344
R-squared 0.304 0.304 0.304
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
Table 4
Investor Funding per Day and Misspellings
Dependent Variable: FUND_PER_DAY
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -0.026***
(-6.89)
WORDS 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.85) (5.80)
FOG -0.002 -0.002
(-1.45) (-1.48)
KINCAID 0.004** 0.004**
(2.00) (2.07)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(-25.95) (-26.23) (-26.23)
60_MONTH -0.041** -0.042** -0.041**
(-2.51) (-2.55) (-2.55)
INT_RATE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(6.74) (6.81) (6.86)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(9.71) (9.93) (10.12)
INCOME 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(4.60) (4.61) (4.55)
VERIFIED -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297***
(-27.97) (-27.95) (-27.98)
DTI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.55) (-1.54) (-1.52)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -0.023 -0.022 -0.024
(-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.32)
DELINQ_AMT 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.22) (0.21) (0.18)
DELINQ_2YRS -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(-3.93) (-4.00) (-4.00)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.57) (2.56) (2.57)
CREDIT_HIST -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-8.81) (-8.64) (-8.59)
FICO 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.05) (0.06) (-0.05)
INQUIRIES -0.006* -0.006* -0.006*
(-1.90) (-1.87) (-1.89)
PUB_RECORD -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.073***
(-3.27) (-3.28) (-3.25)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD -0.012** -0.013** -0.012**
(-2.20) (-2.22) (-2.19)
REV_BAL -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-3.94) (-3.95) (-3.95)
REV_UTIL 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.072***
(4.31) (4.27) (4.11)
OPEN_ACC 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(4.18) (4.11) (3.99)
TOTAL_ACC 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(4.83) (4.84) (4.86)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 103,344 103,344 103,344
Pseudo R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007
Table 5
Hazard Model: Days to Fully Fund and Misspellings
Dependent Variable: FUND_DAYS
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL 0.008***
(3.62)
WORDS -0.000*** -0.000***
(-4.12) (-5.29)
FOG 0.002* 0.002*
(1.72) (1.76)
KINCAID -0.003** -0.003**
(-2.27) (-2.37)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.62) (0.97) (0.98)
60_MONTH 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(3.88) (3.94) (3.89)
INT_RATE 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(7.68) (7.65) (7.60)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.71) (0.40) (0.24)
INCOME -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-5.55) (-5.58) (-5.55)
VERIFIED 0.006 0.007 0.007
(1.28) (1.40) (1.48)
DTI 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.46) (1.41) (1.38)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQ_2YRS 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.27) (0.28) (0.30)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(2.51) (2.52) (2.54)
CREDIT_HIST 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(1.75) (1.55) (1.50)
FICO -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.66)
INQUIRIES 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(8.51) (8.42) (8.40)
PUB_RECORD 0.020 0.020 0.020
(0.80) (0.79) (0.80)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.67)
REV_BAL -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.27)
REV_UTIL 0.027** 0.027** 0.028**
(2.34) (2.38) (2.47)
OPEN_ACC 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.80) (0.90) (1.01)
TOTAL_ACC -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.41)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,700 25,700 25,700
R-squared 0.044 0.045 0.046
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
Table 6
Default and Misspellings
Dependent Variable: DEFAULT
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -0.639***
(-3.16)
WORDS 0.009*** 0.013***
(3.48) (4.54)
FOG -0.256** -0.259**
(-2.44) (-2.48)
KINCAID 0.341*** 0.351***
(2.93) (3.02)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.31) (0.01) (0.00)
60_MONTH -2.899*** -2.952*** -2.926***
(-4.41) (-4.48) (-4.45)
INT_RATE 0.223* 0.228* 0.234**
(1.88) (1.92) (1.97)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 0.006 0.021 0.029
(0.11) (0.38) (0.52)
INCOME 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.293***
(5.03) (5.04) (5.02)
VERIFIED -0.639 -0.683* -0.713*
(-1.54) (-1.65) (-1.72)
DTI -0.054* -0.052* -0.052*
(-1.74) (-1.68) (-1.67)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQ_2YRS -0.114 -0.114 -0.122
(-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.27)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.151***
(-3.04) (-3.06) (-3.08)
CREDIT_HIST -0.005* -0.004* -0.004*
(-1.93) (-1.73) (-1.69)
FICO 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.44) (0.47) (0.44)
INQUIRIES -1.503*** -1.490*** -1.490***
(-8.02) (-7.95) (-7.93)
PUB_RECORD -4.903** -4.854** -4.873**
(-2.29) (-2.26) (-2.27)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD -0.658 -0.654 -0.659
(-1.43) (-1.41) (-1.43)
REV_BAL 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.75) (0.74) (0.74)
REV_UTIL -2.236** -2.262** -2.339**
(-2.09) (-2.12) (-2.19)
OPEN_ACC -0.046 -0.052 -0.057
(-0.72) (-0.81) (-0.89)
TOTAL_ACC 0.020 0.023 0.024
(0.82) (0.93) (0.98)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,700 25,700 25,700
R-squared 0.017 0.018 0.018
Table 7
Returns and Misspellings
Dependent Variable: RETURNS
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
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Dependent Variable:
Partitioning Variable:
VARIABLES Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -23.290** -17.295** -0.021*** -0.018*** 0.006 0.010*** -0.277 -0.645**
(-2.42) (-2.37) (-3.39) (-2.92) (1.09) (2.83) (-0.58) (-2.12)
WORDS -0.034 0.167 0.000* 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.012* 0.016***
(-0.15) (1.42) (1.81) (3.15) (-2.91) (-4.12) (1.66) (3.76)
FOG -6.021* -2.745 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.273 -0.102
(-1.67) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.81) (0.58) (0.20) (-1.31) (-0.61)
KINCAID 8.409** 6.554* 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.301 0.145
(2.00) (1.92) (0.82) (1.27) (-0.57) (-0.60) (1.22) (0.78)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 113.394*** 109.121*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.001 0.000 -0.060 0.027
(51.82) (56.56) (-19.00) (-17.13) (1.45) (0.40) (-0.77) (0.44)
60_MONTH 59.024** -3.331 0.012 -0.097*** 0.042*** 0.011 -3.872*** -1.969*
(2.02) (-0.11) (0.61) (-4.18) (2.96) (0.97) (-3.17) (-1.91)
INT_RATE 12.500*** 4.953 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.293 0.101
(3.43) (1.46) (5.65) (3.47) (2.39) (5.86) (1.18) (0.56)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 26.622 70.735*** -0.017 0.058*** 0.033** -0.006** -2.413** 0.590***
(1.05) (14.68) (-0.99) (13.23) (2.58) (-2.30) (-2.16) (2.63)
INCOME 0.693 4.105 0.002** 0.004** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.331*** 0.351***
(0.49) (1.31) (2.04) (2.35) (-4.00) (-3.36) (3.74) (2.81)
VERIFIED -230.034*** -208.347*** -0.278*** -0.306*** -0.000 0.008 0.014 -0.633
(-11.98) (-12.95) (-18.70) (-20.44) (-0.04) (1.05) (0.01) (-0.96)
DTI -1.570 -3.266*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.019 -0.079
(-1.33) (-3.45) (0.16) (-1.47) (0.16) (1.49) (-0.28) (-1.52)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -124.045 23.001 -0.038 -0.029
(-0.77) (0.11) (-0.37) (-0.19)
DELINQ_AMT 8.987 -12.367* 0.001 -0.001
(0.77) (-1.95) (0.09) (-0.14)
DELINQ_2YRS -45.768*** -6.460 -0.032*** -0.006 0.004 0.008 -0.276 -0.832
(-3.61) (-0.46) (-2.94) (-0.61) (0.40) (1.02) (-0.29) (-1.10)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 4.102** 3.102** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.001* -0.144 -0.155**
(2.02) (2.02) (0.37) (2.61) (1.20) (1.74) (-1.30) (-1.99)
CREDIT_HIST -0.432*** -0.280*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000** 0.011* -0.007*
(-3.92) (-3.35) (-4.59) (-4.04) (-2.28) (2.04) (1.86) (-1.76)
FICO -0.206 -0.810** 0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.011
(-0.48) (-2.12) (2.44) (-0.47) (-1.37) (-1.48) (0.17) (0.57)
INQUIRIES -25.959*** -9.647 -0.012** -0.005 0.023*** 0.019*** -1.629*** -1.661***
(-3.05) (-1.46) (-2.17) (-0.88) (5.32) (5.59) (-4.13) (-5.60)
PUB_RECORD -95.253** -36.053 -0.061* -0.064 0.033 0.066 -5.204 -8.686**
(-2.06) (-0.68) (-1.77) (-1.44) (0.73) (1.48) (-1.42) (-2.49)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD 10.225 11.372 -0.008 -0.014 -0.000 0.003 -0.672 -1.282*
(0.80) (0.89) (-0.91) (-1.35) (-0.03) (0.28) (-0.71) (-1.89)
REV_BAL -1.630*** -1.506*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.017 -0.004
(-5.38) (-2.87) (-3.51) (-1.15) (-1.43) (-0.50) (0.75) (-0.15)
REV_UTIL 163.069*** 141.768*** 0.127*** 0.030 0.009 0.013 -0.878 -1.824
(3.64) (4.30) (4.05) (1.06) (0.39) (0.77) (-0.40) (-1.16)
OPEN_ACC 9.153*** 5.640*** 0.004** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.033 -0.048
(3.50) (2.70) (2.42) (0.65) (0.10) (0.64) (0.25) (-0.47)
TOTAL_ACC 2.899*** 0.432 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001* -0.000 0.020 0.033
(2.74) (0.50) (4.05) (3.43) (-1.89) (-0.86) (0.43) (0.78)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,045 37,562 34,045 37,562 6,275 11,747 6,275 11,747
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.296 0.330 0.007 0.008 0.054 0.054 0.022 0.024
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
EMP_LENGTH EMP_LENGTH EMP_LENGTH
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
Table 8
Effects of Misspelling - Partitioned by Employment Length
FUND_PER_DAY FUND_DAYS DEFAULT RETURNS
EMP_LENGTH
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Dependent Variable:
Partitioning Variable:
VARIABLES High Low High Low High Low High Low
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -28.676** -33.357*** -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.006 0.011*** -0.552 -0.872**
(-2.42) (-6.07) (-2.61) (-4.79) (1.51) (2.77) (-1.45) (-2.42)
WORDS 0.475 0.541*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.006 0.023***
(1.59) (4.14) (3.08) (3.86) (-1.28) (-4.82) (0.98) (4.42)
FOG -6.541 -2.407 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.004* -0.298* -0.456**
(-1.59) (-0.99) (-1.03) (-0.66) (1.13) (1.80) (-1.71) (-2.34)
KINCAID 10.779** 5.424** 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.004* 0.399* 0.481**
(2.43) (2.10) (1.16) (1.43) (-1.57) (-1.82) (1.92) (2.27)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 103.075*** 108.508*** -0.022*** -0.036*** 0.001 0.003** -0.048 -0.137
(53.96) (53.73) (-23.01) (-21.57) (1.61) (2.49) (-0.84) (-1.55)
60_MONTH 33.298 -57.196** -0.045** -0.075*** 0.005 0.024* -0.722 -3.179***
(0.90) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-3.23) (0.38) (1.93) (-0.64) (-2.88)
INT_RATE 24.473*** 2.809 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.187 0.246
(5.51) (1.08) (6.36) (3.42) (5.48) (3.68) (0.99) (1.18)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 9.433*** 8.514*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 -0.065 0.055
(3.80) (6.04) (2.79) (5.90) (0.73) (0.70) (-0.75) (0.53)
INCOME -1.764 60.825*** -0.001 0.083*** -0.001** -0.031*** 0.091** 2.664***
(-1.29) (9.74) (-1.26) (9.99) (-2.10) (-6.17) (2.09) (6.06)
VERIFIED -248.508*** -193.024*** -0.281*** -0.308*** 0.010 0.012 -0.795 -1.492**
(-10.68) (-15.35) (-17.28) (-21.96) (1.19) (1.25) (-1.14) (-1.96)
DTI 0.492 0.367 0.002* 0.004*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.038 0.044
(0.32) (0.50) (1.77) (4.83) (0.27) (-0.97) (-0.61) (0.85)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -150.740 105.801 -0.220** 0.106
(-0.90) (0.57) (-2.00) (0.50)
DELINQ_AMT 6.818 -22.546 0.009 0.035
(0.60) (-0.30) (1.13) (0.48)
DELINQ_2YRS -49.909*** -32.612*** -0.021** -0.051*** 0.000 0.015 0.176 -1.599*
(-3.44) (-3.10) (-2.24) (-3.62) (0.01) (1.50) (0.22) (-1.70)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 2.358 4.374*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 -0.193** -0.130
(1.18) (3.44) (1.99) (2.75) (2.32) (1.41) (-2.32) (-1.42)
CREDIT_HIST -0.571*** -0.253*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.004
(-4.80) (-3.70) (-5.12) (-4.41) (-0.29) (0.74) (0.62) (-0.94)
FICO 0.371 -1.438*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000* -0.024 0.016
(0.76) (-5.24) (1.04) (-2.55) (0.60) (-1.74) (-1.21) (0.74)
INQUIRIES -48.142*** -2.459 -0.021*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.019*** -1.390*** -1.507***
(-5.39) (-0.45) (-3.82) (0.50) (4.13) (4.85) (-4.26) (-4.34)
PUB_RECORD -105.033 -56.125* -0.092* -0.046 0.055 -0.000 -9.819** -3.178
(-1.63) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-1.18) (1.09) (-0.01) (-2.16) (-0.89)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD -5.115 7.438 -0.020* -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -1.647 -0.406
(-0.29) (0.89) (-1.69) (-0.16) (0.22) (-0.49) (-1.60) (-0.54)
REV_BAL -1.635*** -4.271*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.080
(-5.92) (-4.87) (-3.18) (-3.69) (-0.56) (0.58) (0.35) (-1.28)
REV_UTIL 202.242*** 15.468 0.092*** -0.028 0.035* 0.059*** -2.932* -4.992***
(3.91) (0.56) (2.98) (-0.92) (1.82) (2.94) (-1.69) (-2.71)
OPEN_ACC 7.549*** 4.202** 0.004** -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.218** -0.042
(2.80) (2.36) (2.21) (-0.91) (1.55) (0.90) (-2.03) (-0.36)
TOTAL_ACC 0.423 0.564 0.001 0.002*** -0.001** 0.001 0.079** -0.079
(0.41) (0.72) (1.43) (2.82) (-2.02) (1.38) (2.34) (-1.56)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,137 36,298 34,137 36,298 7,709 9,971 7,709 9,971
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.256 0.276 0.008 0.008 0.048 0.048 0.018 0.026
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
Table 9
Effects of Misspelling - Partitioned by Borrower Income
FUND_PER_DAY FUND_DAYS DEFAULT RETURNS
INCOME INCOME INCOME INCOME
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Dependent Variable:
Partitioning Variable:
VARIABLES High Low High Low High Low High Low
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL -24.840** -23.689*** -0.019*** -0.025*** 0.002 0.010*** -0.160 -0.773***
(-2.27) (-3.37) (-2.91) (-3.77) (0.30) (2.90) (-0.35) (-2.76)
WORDS 0.833** 0.373*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.009 0.013***
(2.36) (2.66) (5.49) (3.65) (-1.03) (-4.21) (0.99) (4.19)
FOG -1.790 -4.536* -0.001 0.000 0.008** 0.001 -0.773** -0.084
(-0.48) (-1.74) (-0.28) (0.01) (2.34) (0.85) (-2.38) (-0.74)
KINCAID 7.836* 7.172** 0.002 -0.001 -0.009** -0.002 0.947** 0.121
(1.83) (2.35) (0.78) (-0.18) (-2.45) (-1.06) (2.54) (0.95)
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT 119.695*** 101.426*** -0.016*** -0.028*** 0.001 0.001 -0.045 -0.013
(54.48) (53.85) (-16.15) (-21.27) (0.75) (1.33) (-0.45) (-0.30)
60_MONTH 188.997*** -166.070*** 0.074*** -0.229*** 0.021 0.034*** -4.145** -2.527***
(6.42) (-4.94) (4.01) (-8.41) (1.16) (3.24) (-2.39) (-3.00)
INT_RATE -27.802*** 39.469*** -0.004 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.004** -0.095 0.749***
(-5.02) (6.90) (-1.50) (5.48) (2.86) (1.98) (-0.20) (4.17)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH 11.671*** 9.531*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 -0.121 0.006
(4.64) (5.41) (7.04) (4.88) (0.47) (0.60) (-0.71) (0.11)
INCOME 4.692 2.002 0.005** 0.004*** -0.006*** -0.002*** 0.615*** 0.113***
(1.24) (1.09) (2.55) (2.63) (-3.28) (-3.94) (3.32) (3.14)
VERIFIED -294.562*** -199.824*** -0.377*** -0.269*** 0.010 0.001 -1.004 -0.096
(-13.35) (-12.76) (-20.06) (-18.67) (0.56) (0.19) (-0.65) (-0.21)
DTI -1.554 -2.441*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 0.001** 0.172 -0.071**
(-1.15) (-2.65) (0.61) (-0.92) (-1.78) (2.07) (1.41) (-2.08)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT -92.033 465.584 0.025 0.989***
(-0.75) (1.61) (0.31) (3.11)
DELINQ_AMT 3.252 -16.626 -0.006 -0.012
(0.34) (-1.63) (-0.82) (-1.42)
DELINQ_2YRS -33.851** -21.136 -0.022*** -0.038** -0.006 0.004 0.532 -0.879
(-2.20) (-1.36) (-2.59) (-2.49) (-0.60) (0.52) (0.49) (-1.28)
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ 2.525 3.740** 0.002 0.003** 0.002 -0.000 -0.171 -0.009
(1.22) (2.45) (1.34) (2.12) (1.14) (-0.53) (-1.27) (-0.15)
CREDIT_HIST -0.590*** -0.383*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.002
(-4.56) (-4.76) (-4.72) (-6.48) (0.36) (1.11) (-0.89) (-0.65)
FICO -2.065*** 0.521 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.025 0.006
(-3.02) (1.42) (-0.61) (1.24) (-0.31) (-1.28) (0.63) (0.41)
INQUIRIES -27.340*** -18.719*** -0.013** -0.012* 0.019*** 0.019*** -1.545*** -1.394***
(-3.07) (-2.97) (-2.56) (-1.95) (3.13) (5.93) (-2.72) (-5.69)
PUB_RECORD -81.367 -193.543*** -0.104*** -0.100* 0.098* 0.019 -14.071** -0.162
(-1.54) (-3.11) (-3.61) (-1.78) (1.73) (0.46) (-2.48) (-0.06)
TIME_SINCE_RECORD -4.669 -30.662* -0.029*** -0.018 0.014 0.001 -2.622** 0.075
(-0.35) (-1.69) (-4.06) (-1.19) (1.10) (0.08) (-2.22) (0.09)
REV_BAL -1.483** -0.846** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.022 0.004
(-2.21) (-2.42) (-0.80) (-1.44) (-0.74) (-0.82) (0.53) (0.25)
REV_UTIL 283.246*** 43.281 0.167*** -0.020 0.009 0.058*** -1.606 -4.615***
(6.30) (1.17) (5.84) (-0.58) (0.28) (3.85) (-0.51) (-3.71)
OPEN_ACC 13.124*** 4.703** 0.004** 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.186 0.050
(5.06) (2.17) (2.54) (0.72) (1.10) (-0.82) (-1.01) (0.68)
TOTAL_ACC 1.555 0.522 0.003*** 0.001* -0.001* 0.000 0.108 -0.010
(1.34) (0.65) (3.72) (1.65) (-1.65) (0.36) (1.45) (-0.39)
Purpose Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Homeownership Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Month Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
State-Year-Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,972 35,393 33,972 35,393 5,013 11,089 5,013 11,089
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.321 0.275 0.007 0.011 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.020
State-Year-Month clustered t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix A
Table 10
Effects of Misspelling - Partitioned by Interest Rate
FUND_PER_DAY FUND_DAYS DEFAULT RETURNS
INT_RATE INT_RATE INT_RATE INT_RATE
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Dependent Variables
FUND_PER_DAY
The amount, in dollars per day, invested in the loan by investors through LendingClub's website. 
Calculated as the total number of dollars invested divided by the number of days between the date 
the loan was listed and the date the loan was funded.
FUND_DAYS The number of days that it takes the loan to be fully funded.
DEFAULT Indicator variable for whether the loan ended in default.
RETURNS
Net yield to the investors (before fees) in percentage terms. Calculated as the internal rate of return 
on the loan assuming uniform payment over length of loan life of all payments received.
Loan Characteristics
LOAN_AMT Size of the loan in thousands of dollars.
60_MONTH Indicator variable for whether the loan is for 60 months. 0 indicates a 36 month loan.
INT_RATE Stated interest rate of the loan, in percentage terms.
LIST_MONTH Months since beginning of data set at time of application.
PURPOSE
Unverified purpose of the loan submitted by the lender at time of application (e.g., Credit Card 
Refinancing, Debt Consolidation, Home Improvement, Business)
Borrower Characteristics
EMP_LENGTH Ordered categorical variable for length of employment at current employer at time of application.
INCOME Borrower submitted monthly income in thousands of dollars per month.
VERIFIED Indicator variable for whether borrower employment information is confirmed by LendingClub.
DTI Debt-to-income ratio at time of application.
HOME_OWNERSHIP Home ownership status of borrower at time of application (e.g., Rent, Own, Mortgage, None)
Borrower Credit History
DELINQUENT
Indicator variable for whether any of borrowers credit accounts are delinquent at time of 
application.
DELINQ_AMT
Amount of debt on borrower's credit report that is delinquent at time of application in thousands of 
dollars.
DELINQ_2YRS
Number of delinquencies reported on borrower's credit report within the last two years at the time 
of application.
TIME_SINCE_DELINQ
Ordered categorical variable for time since last delinquency on borrower's credit report at time of 
application, where lower numbers indicate more recent delinquency.
CREDIT_HIST Length of borrower credit history, in months at time of application.
FICO Borrower's FICO score at time of application.
INQUIRIES
Number of hard credit inquiries on borrower's credit report within the last six months at time of 
application.
PUB_RECORD Number of public records on borrower's credit report at time of application.
TIME_SINCE_RECORD
Ordered categorical variable for time since last public record on borrower's credit report at time of 
application, where lower numbers indicate more recent record.
REV_BAL Amount of revolving debt in thousands of dollars on borrower's credit report at time of application.
REV_UTIL Percentage of credit limit on revolving accounts being used by borrower at time of application.
OPEN_ACC Number of open credit accounts held by the borrower at time of application.
TOTAL_ACC Number of credit accounts ever held by the borrower at time of application.
Loan Description Characteristics
MSPL Number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted loan description.
SQRT_MSPL Square root of the number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted loan description.
PCT_MSPL
Number of misspellings within the text of the borrower submitted loan description divided by the 
total number of words in the description.
WORDS Total number of words in the borrower submitted loan description.
FOG
FOG Index of the borrower submitted loan description. FOG is a measure of lexical complexity 
which is increasing in sentence length and use of multisyllable words.
KINCAID Flesch-Kincaid ease of reading index, which is increasing in sentence length and syllables per word.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
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